, the district court sentenced Stacey Koon and Laurence Powell, two Los Angeles police officers, to 30 months imprisonment and two years supervised release for depriving the victim, Rodney King, of his constitutional rights under color of state law.
The 30-month sentences were substantially below the guideline range of 70 to 87 months. To reach the 30-month level the court relied on two theories of departure, one of which was the wrongful conduct of the victim.1 The factual context in Koon differed greatly from cases in which the departure provision previously had been applied. The Ninth Circuit found the departure unjustified and reversed. United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1993 ).
Many would argue, and I agree, that the Ninth Circuit's repudiation of the sentencing court's departure in the Koon case is justified. However, the Circuit interprets too narrowly ?5K2.10, which allows sentencing courts to depart from the guidelines when the victim's wrongful conduct contributes signifi cantly to provoking the offense behavior. The Ninth Circuit's reading of ?5K2.10 is not supported by the text, nor does it make sense as a policy matter. Moreover, the opinion offers little guidance on what constitutes the proper degree of departure under ?5K2.10. The end result is that sentencing courts are given little discretion to use ?5K2.10 to depart in other civil rights cases and possibly in cases outside that context. L THE VICTIM CONDUCT POLICY STATEMENT (?5K2.10) That a defendant's punishment should be adjusted to account for the fact that his criminal conduct occurred in response to wrongful conduct by the victim is probably not a controversial claim. In fact, it might strike many people as an intuitive concept. This intuition is embodied in homicide doctrine, which traditionally has considered premedi tated homicides to be more serious than those committed "in the heat of passion." The latter are designated "manslaughter" and penalized less severely than intentional homicides.
The federal sentencing guidelines have extended this intuition to apply to all violent offenses and some non-violent offenses. Section 5K2.10 provides:
If the victim's wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense behavior, * Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. the court may reduce the sentence below the guideline range to reflect the nature and circum stances of the offense. In deciding the extent of a sentence reduction, the court should consider:
(a) the size and strength of the victim, or other relevant physical characteristics, in comparison with those of the defendant; (b) the persistence of the victim's conduct and any efforts by the defendant to prevent confronta tion;
(c) the danger reasonably perceived by the defendant, including the victim's reputation for violence; (d) the danger actually presented to the defendant by the victim; and (e) any other relevant conduct by the victim that substantially contributed to the danger presented.
Sentencing courts have discussed their reliance on ?5K2.10 in a few published cases. Many involve assault resulting in serious bodily injury on Indian reservations. Others include the mailing of threaten ing letters, extortion, and, interestingly, manslaugh ter^ II. THE SENTENCING COURT'S VIEW In the Koon case, Judge John G. Davies decided that ?5K2.10 was relevant in sentencing two police officers convicted of using unreasonable force to arrest Rodney Glen King. Judge Davies's sentencing memorandum states that King's wrongful conduct significantly contributed to provoking the unlawful conduct of the officers such that their "conduct fell outside the range of the more typical offenses for which the Guidelines were designed."
The sentencing court pointed to several examples of King's "illegal conduct" prior to and during his Thus, Graham teaches that the dynamic arrest situation that the sentencing court in Koon found to be unusual enough to consider for ?5K2.10 departure analysis is not unusual at all. Rather, the volatility of the arrest situation is a factor inherent in excessive force cases. Therefore, said the Circuit, the volatility of the arrest situation cannot be unusual enough to justify a departure from the heartland of offenses contemplated by ?2H1.4. This part of the Ninth Circuit's opinion is much more persuasive than its first attack. But it too is flawed because of its rigidity.
The most direct way to address it is to ask: Are there cases in which the sentencing judge reasonably could conclude that the volatility of the situation could justify a departure even though the jury has already taken volatility into account at the liability stage? I think the answer should be yes. It is unpersuasive to argue that because the volatility of the arrest situation is considered, along with many other factors, in the course of the jury's decision to impose liability, factors such as the volatility of the arrest and the victim's misconduct are not relevant at sentencing.
The volatility of the situation and the relationship between the volatility of the arrest and the particular victim's misconduct might be better addressed and refined at sentencing than at the liability stage.
Considering this relationship at sentencing allows judges the discretion necessary to make contextualized decisions that recognize the differ ences between official misconduct that is deliberate and misconduct that occurs as reasonable force "morphs" into unreasonable force during an arrest.
Interpretations such as the Ninth Circuit's that link the departures to the success of a defense at the liability stage limit departures in a categorical manner that undermines even the very limited amount of discretionary sentencing afforded sentencing courts under the guidelines.
C. Analogy to Deliberate Assaults
Third, the Ninth Circuit attacked the sentencing court's attempt to distinguish law enforcement officers in excessive force cases from corrections officers who engage in deliberate and unprovoked assaults. Both groups of officials are subject to sentencing under ?2H1.4 which is titled Interference with Civil Rights Under Color of Law. This section makes no distinction between uses of force that initially are lawful and those that are not. The sentencing court saw the law enforcement officer's use of excessive force in the volatile arrest situation as fundamentally different from and exculpating as compared to the case of a correction officer or other state agent (including a police officer) who intentionally uses a dangerous weapon to assault a victim without legitimate cause. The sentencing court was concerned that the stringent Aggravated 
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Assault guideline ?2A2.2, which applied to the Koon case through ?2H1.4, was applicable to a "heartland" of deliberate and unprovoked assaults. Because the Koon case involved an assault following from a volatile arrest situation, the court deemed a departure necessary.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed after evaluating the sentencing court's analysis: "The fact that appellants were authorized to use some force in this case does not mitigate the fact that they used too much. Under the structure and policies of the Guidelines, it makes it worse." The Circuit made a very good point.
Unfortunately, it did not address the puzzle that the sentencing court attempted to solve. Both the sentencing court and the circuit take rigid, categorical approachs that are inappropriate to the complex issues inherent to excessive force cases.
The sentencing court suggested that all uses of force by police officers in the arrest context are similar to each other and dissimilar to unprovoked and deliber ate uses of force by state officials outside the arrest context. The Circuit suggested that volatility never could be considered at sentencing because the jury considered that factor at the liability stage. The Ninth Circuit relied on the forceful notion that ?2H1.4 correctly punishes more severely official misconduct than comparable conduct by private actors. The Circuit additionally pointed out that the fact that Koon and Powell were authorized to use some force in this case did not mitigate the fact that they used too much.
It is difficult to argue against these two state ments. Moreover, it is understandable that the Circuit discussed the distinction between private and public actors in light of the fact that it characterized the sentencing court's discussion of its departure from the But considering the distinction between public and private actors does not help solve the puzzle of how deliberate misconduct by officials and miscon duct by officials occurring in situations where initial use of force is justified should be treated at sentenc ing. It is similarly unhelpful to point out that Koon's and Powell's limited authority to use some force in the volatile arrest situation does not justify use of excessive force. The puzzle we need to solve assumes the second point from the beginning. The Ninth Circuit does not address the implications of the sentencing court's forceful argument that we might view as more reprehensible the excessive use of force by government officials that has absolutely no explanation.
A better analysis would recognize that the appropriate comparison is between groups of officials engaging in misconduct under two different circum stances, rather than comparing private individuals and public individuals. Since civil rights violations flowing from uses of unreasonable force almost always involve some kind of misconduct by the victim in the course of a likely volatile arrest situa tion, perhaps the Sentencing Commission failed to take these factors into account in determining the heartland offenses for the aggravated assault guideline and the criminal civil rights guideline? contrary to the sentencing court's conclusion.
Though it did not say so, it is more likely that the Commission believed that sentencing courts could accommodate some of the differences between these two groups of officials through variations in sen tences along the guideline range. Since the Commisison did not say so and since 18 U.S.C. 3553(b) indicates that the Commission has a burden to make its decisions clear, courts probably should have more discretion to depart in these cases. And, to the extent that these differences cannot be accom modated, we could easily conclude that the case of unprovoked and deliberate assault by a state official demands an upward departure from the guideline sentence.
IV. A BETTER VIEW
Even if variations along the guideline range can accommodate differences between the two groups of officials first discussed, the idea of significant Even if the heartland offenses contemplated by the assault guideline as applied to police officers in civil rights cases take into consideration that arrests generally are volatile and occur in response to at least some misconduct on the victim's part, that heartland cannot describe every case. There is a difference between the arrestee who merely struggles and the arrestee who assaults the arresting officer. 
